



THE WATSON SCHOOL
of International
and Public Affairs

BROWN UNIVERSITY

CLIMATE
SOLUTIONS LAB

APPENDIX TO

Pulling the Plug on Rogue AI: Why US Authorities Cannot Count on a Fast Shutdown of Electricity

CSL White Paper
October 28, 2026

The Climate Solutions Lab's mission is to create, learn and distribute solution-oriented climate knowledge at Brown and across the world. CSL focuses especially on the political economy of energy, and how to advance a clean energy transition. It is especially interested in public-facing policy analyses on barriers to progress on climate change at the domestic and international levels.

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The authors thank Joshua Basseches, Max Bradley, and Han Zhang for their feedback on early drafts.

Appendix A. The proposals, and why the gaps have not been closed

Note: This appendix was drafted by Claude (Opus 5.5) under the authors' direction and from the sources listed, then reviewed and edited by the authors, who are responsible for its content.

The proposals against the five failure modes

Each active proposal is set out below against the five failure modes identified in section 2. Tables A-1 and A-2 cover measures aimed at shutdown itself. Table A-3 covers measures that bear on the court route discussed under failure mode 4.

Table A-1: National Proposals

Proposal	Status	What it would fix	What it leaves untouched
AI Kill Switch Act (Lieu–Moran, July 2026)	Introduced, in subcommittee	Federal authority to order a halt; obliges covered developers to maintain the capability to stop inference and shut a system down. Routing it through DHS gives the security judgment an owner — part of failure mode 5	Reaches the developer, not the facility. No role for DOE, FERC, NERC or grid operators, no facility identification, and no answer when the developer cannot or will not comply. Failure modes 1–3 untouched
UK Cyber Security and Resilience Bill amendment	Proposed, not endorsed by government	The only proposal reaching the physical layer: last-resort powers to shut down data centers, duties on operators to install shutdown infrastructure and maintain secure channels, mandatory drills, post-mortem before resuming. Failure modes 3 and 5, plus adding switching equipment	Not US law and may never be law. The UK Cabinet Office has reportedly resisted it, arguing a national framework accomplishes little without international cooperation
FERC large-load interconnection proceedings (Docket RM26-4-000; six section 206 show cause orders, 18 June 2026)	ANOPR with no rule issued; six show cause orders live, responses due within 60 days	The only live vehicle for attaching conditions at interconnection. One of five reform categories is a new transmission service for flexible loads that can limit their use — the nearest hook for requiring that a facility be capable of being shut down. PJM's co-location order and SPP's High Impact Large Load process are cited as models	Not a safety proceeding: shutdown-readiness is not under consideration, and developers are actively resisting curtailment obligations. The six orders cover PJM, SPP, NYISO, MISO, CAISO and ISO-NE — ERCOT is not among them, so the largest concentration of Texas compute sits outside the whole exercise
Incident reporting frameworks (EU GPAI Code of Practice; proposed international escalation criteria)	Partly in force, partly proposed	Addresses recognition: severity-based reporting timelines, and criteria escalating loss of developer control immediately, before confirmed harm	Reporting is not execution. None confers power to act on the finding, and none involves an energy regulator

Table A-2: State-Level Proposals or Recent Policies

Proposal	Status	What it would fix	What it leaves untouched
New York A3356, Advanced Artificial Intelligence Licensing Act (Vanel)	In Assembly Science and Technology Committee, 2025–26 session; no Senate companion; a prior version (A8195) died in 2023–24	The one state measure found that reaches shutdown capability. Section 525 requires every licensee to maintain internal controls that can “safely and indefinitely cease the operation of the system or a major part of the system” within a reasonable time. It also creates state stop powers: emergency suspension of a license for up to thirty days without notice or hearing (§ 515(5)); summary suspension, administrative seizure and stop orders (§ 502(10)); and written cease demands against prohibited systems (§ 530(2)). Addresses failure mode 4 and part of failure mode 5 at state level	Reaches the licensee (AI developer or deployer), not the building/facility. No role for a data center, utility, grid operator, transmission owner or state utility commission; no facility identification, no isolation capability, no restart path. Failure modes 1–3 untouched. Has not advanced out of committee in two consecutive sessions, so it indicates what is conceivable rather than what is likely
Texas Senate Bill 6 (2025), amending PURA §§ 37.0561, 39.169 and 39.170	Enacted; passed 1 June 2025, signed by the Governor and effective immediately	The only state measure that reaches the electrical layer rather than the developer, and the closest thing in the United States to a standing chain of command for reducing a named facility’s draw on the grid. It applies to loads of 75 MW or more. Under § 37.0561 ERCOT may direct a large load to reduce net consumption or deploy its on-site generation, once a grid emergency is occurring or imminent and market tools are exhausted. Under § 39.170 utilities must develop curtailment protocols for large loads interconnected after 31 December 2025, applicable during firm load shed. Under § 39.169 the PUCT reviews and may condition co-location arrangements. Bears on failure mode 5, and on the equipment needed to curtail a named facility	The trigger is grid reliability, not security: no security determination can invoke it, and nothing in the statute contemplates an AI incident. Section 37.0561 reaches only loads newly requesting interconnection or expansion whose backup generation can serve at least half of demand. And the remedy runs the wrong way for this purpose, because ERCOT’s emergency power is to direct a facility to deploy its on-site generators, which removes it from the grid while keeping the computing running, and the § 39.170 curtailment protocols do not reach that generation. Texas has built, as a reliability tool, the mechanism that failure mode 2 identifies as the obstacle. Failure modes 1–4 untouched
California SB 53	In force	Makes unauthorized access to, modification of, or exfiltration of model weights a reportable critical safety incident, with no requirement that harm have occurred. This is the closest thing in US law to an early warning for the scenario in the report, since weight movement is how a system escapes the reach of a physical order	Reporting runs to California’s Office of Emergency Services within 15 days, or 24 hours where there is imminent danger of death or serious injury, both long relative to plausible relocation times. The separate loss-of-control trigger requires death or bodily injury to have already occurred, making it useless as early warning. And the obligation is to report what has

Proposal	Status	What it would fix	What it leaves untouched
			been detected, not to detect anything
New York RAISE Act (S6953B / A6453B, as amended by A9449 / S8828)	Enacted 19 December 2025; amended 27 March 2026 (Chapter 96); the amended regime takes effect 1 January 2027	In force now: published safety protocols, 72-hour reporting of qualifying safety incidents, an oversight office in the Department of Financial Services, and penalties of \$1 million for a first violation and \$3 million thereafter. From 1 January 2027 the amendment replaces Article 44-B, raising the covered-developer threshold to \$500 million in revenue and requiring a disclosure statement to be filed with the Office before a frontier model is developed, deployed or operated in NY	Reporting and disclosure only, in both the current and the amended form. No shutdown capability and no role for any energy regulator. The 2027 filing condition is a precondition on lawful operation, not a power to stop one: nothing authorizes any official to halt a model already running. Failure modes 1–4 untouched
Illinois Artificial Intelligence Safety Measures Act (SB 315)	Signed 6 July 2026; effective 1 January 2027	The first transparency regime to require independent third-party audits of large frontier developers, annually from 1 January 2028. Covers models above 10^{26} operations from developers with more than \$500 million in revenue; incident reporting within 72 hours to IEMA-OHS and the Attorney General, 24 hours to law enforcement. Lists a model “evading the control” of its developer as a catastrophic risk	No shutdown capability. The audit requirement reaches whether protocols exist, not whether anything can be stopped, and no provision names an energy regulator. Failure modes 1–4 untouched
Utah H.B. 286 (1st Substitute), Artificial Intelligence Transparency Act	Enacted; effective 6 May 2026	Requires a published public safety plan for catastrophic risk, risk-assessment summaries before deployment, incident reporting to the Office of Artificial Intelligence Policy within 15 days and disclosure to law enforcement within 24 hours, quarterly internal-use reporting, and whistleblower protection. Same 10^{26} operations and \$500 million thresholds	No shutdown capability and no energy regulator. The public safety plan must address “a frontier model circumventing oversight mechanisms” but prescribes no control mechanism. Failure modes 1–4 untouched
California executive order on shutdown mechanisms (18 September 2026)	Directs experts to recommend	First official assessment of whether shutdown mechanisms work and how to verify them independently	Advisory, state-level, developer-facing. No authority over utilities; California hosts a minority of US frontier compute
Michigan HB 4668	Introduced 24 June 2025; pending	The nearest surviving descendant of SB 1047. Large developers must maintain a safety protocol describing how they would respond if a critical risk materializes or becomes imminent	Response planning, not a stop mechanism. The original SB 1047 “full shutdown” duty, vetoed in 2024, has been revived in no state bill other than New York’s A3356

Proposal	Status	What it would fix	What it leaves untouched
New Jersey S4446 (Mukherji)	Introduced 11 June 2026; pending	Would require large frontier developers, at a \$100 million revenue threshold that is the lowest found in any state, to file annual risk-management disclosures and per-model disclosures with the Attorney General, mapped to the NIST AI Risk Management Framework, with the Attorney General empowered to audit compliance	No shutdown capability. Carries a five-year sunset. Failure modes 1–4 untouched

Measures bearing on the court route

Section 2 finds that, absent a cooperative operator, the realistic path to a shutdown runs through the courts, and that its speed depends on a legal theory that does not yet exist for an AI agent acting on its own. The existing tools assume a human perpetrator: a warrant requires probable cause that a crime was committed, and the federal injunction statute (18 U.S.C. § 1345) reaches ongoing fraud and illegal interception, not hacking as such. Four measures bear on that gap. None was written with a facility-level shutdown in mind, and none addresses failure modes 1 or 2.

Table A-3: Measures Bearing on the Court Route

Proposal	Status	What it would fix	What it leaves untouched
AI Agent Accountability Act (Hawley–Murphy, October 2026)	Introduced 1 October 2026; no bill number, committee referral or published text as of early October	Would extend the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) to the “knowing operation of an AI agent that recklessly causes” hacking damage or loss, impose liability on developers that fail to adopt reasonable safeguards against hacking, and let the Attorney General and state attorneys general sue to enjoin operators and developers. Supplies both a culpable person and an injunction route where no human directed the agent: the main legal gap in failure mode 4	Reaches the operator and developer, not the facility: as reported, nothing compels a data center operator or utility, speeds emergency relief, or addresses restart. Text not yet published, and the Administration has reportedly favored industry self-regulation. Failure modes 1–3 and 5 untouched

Proposal	Status	What it would fix	What it leaves untouched
International Cybercrime Prevention Act (S. 2139, 117th Congress; Whitehouse, Graham, Tillis, Blumenthal)	Introduced 21 June 2021 (an earlier version in 2018); not enacted	Would extend § 1345 injunctions to CFAA damage offenses affecting 100 or more protected computers in a year, closing the gap that the statute reaches fraud but not hacking as such. Would also let the Attorney General seek orders barring lawsuits against parties that comply, with the United States reimbursing their reasonable costs. Bears on failure mode 4, and on the liability concerns in failure mode 3	Still requires a person violating or about to violate the CFAA, so an agent acting beyond its deployer's intent may fall outside it. Nothing on facility identification, backup power or chain of command. Failure modes 1, 2 and 5 untouched
Executive order "Promoting Advanced Artificial Intelligence Innovation and Security" (2 June 2026)	In force	Directs the Attorney General to prioritize enforcement of existing federal criminal law, including the CFAA and the wire-fraud statute, against anyone who uses AI, or "employs AI agents," to access computers unlawfully. Signals that Justice Department resources will go to AI-enabled intrusions	Creates no new authority or cause of action, and prioritizes prosecution rather than emergency relief. Does not resolve how existing law applies when no human intended the conduct. Failure modes 1–3 and 5 untouched
California Civil Code § 1714.46 (AB 316, 2025)	In force since 1 January 2026	In a civil action against anyone who developed, modified or used an AI system, bars the defense that "the artificial intelligence autonomously caused the harm." Strengthens a victim's civil suit against the deployer in the report's scenario, which could support a request for an injunction. Bears on failure mode 4	Civil liability only, and only in California; other defenses such as causation and foreseeability remain. No emergency procedure and no reach to the facility. Failure modes 1–3 and 5 untouched

Sources for Appendix A

- [New York A3356 bill text](#), for section 525 and the related suspension and cease provisions
- [New York A3356 status and sponsors](#), New York State Senate
- [New York A9449 \(RAISE Act amendment\), summary, text and actions](#)
- [New York enacts the RAISE Act regulating frontier AI models](#), Morrison Foerster
- [Illinois Artificial Intelligence Safety Measures Act \(SB 315\)](#), KPMG regulatory alert
- [Illinois enacts AI safety law with third-party audits](#), Skadden
- [Utah H.B. 286, 1st Substitute, bill text](#)
- [Michigan HB 4668 bill text](#)
- [Texas SB 6 \(89th Legislature, 2025\), bill text](#)
- [Texas Senate Bill 6: Understanding the Impacts to Large Loads and Co-located Generation](#), Baker Botts, for the PURA sections
- [Texas SB6 Establishes New Transmission Fees and Interconnection Standards](#), Pillsbury, for the 75 MW threshold and emergency directives
- [New Jersey S4446 bill text](#)
- [Illinois SB 3444 bill text and status](#)

- [Steptoe 2026 State Artificial Intelligence Legislative Tracker](#)
- [California SB 1047 bill text](#), for the vetoed “full shutdown” definition
- [AI Agent Accountability Act Targets the Company Running the Agent](#), Beri, October 2026
- [AI Agent Accountability Act: Rogue Agent Hacks Now Carry Criminal Risk for Executives](#), Tech Times, 2 October 2026
- [S. 2139, International Cybercrime Prevention Act \(117th Congress\), bill text](#), for the § 1345 amendment
- [President Trump Signs Executive Order Establishing AI Cybersecurity and Frontier Model Framework](#), Latham & Watkins, June 2026
- [California Eliminates the “Autonomous AI” Defense: What AB 316 Means for AI Deployers](#), Mondaq, for Civil Code § 1714.46

Appendix B. The legal authorities in detail

Note: This appendix was drafted by Claude (Opus 5.5) under the authors’ direction and from the sources listed, then reviewed and edited by the authors, who are responsible for its content.

Section 202(c) of the Federal Power Act

Section 202(c) lets the Secretary of Energy order temporary changes to the generation, transmission or delivery of electricity during an emergency. The authority dates to 1935 and was transferred to DOE in 1977. DOE records 19 events from 2000 through May 2025, eleven of them weather-related: hurricanes, heat waves and winter storms including Uri in 2021 and Elliott in 2022, alongside the California energy crisis of 2000-01 and Winter Storm Fern in 2026, which alone drew 20 orders. Individual orders have run from a few hours to more than a year.

Two features of that record matter. Every order was issued by the Secretary of Energy, on an emergency finding made inside the energy sector rather than on a security determination made outside it. And every order directed more power to flow, by keeping plants online, raising output, or relaxing emissions limits. The authority has never been used to cut a customer off.

That orientation is the problem. Section 202(c) is built around a shortage of electricity — too little supply for the demand on the system. An AI loss-of-control response needs the opposite: an order to stop delivering power to a customer that very much wants it. The rest of Section 202 confirms the reading. Subsection (a) promotes voluntary interconnection and coordination among utilities. Subsection (b) lets FERC compel interconnection or a sale of energy, and only at the request of a state, a transmission entity or a utility, after notice and hearing. All three subsections are aimed at getting power delivered, and all are triggered from inside the energy sector. None contemplates an official outside that sector ordering delivery to stop.

Michigan v. Department of Energy

Any argument that 202(c) could nonetheless be stretched to cover an AI emergency became substantially harder in September 2026. In *Michigan v. Department of Energy*, decided 11 September 2026, the D.C. Circuit vacated DOE's order requiring continued operation of the J.H. Campbell coal plant in Michigan. The court held that DOE cannot invoke 202(c) without establishing a genuine emergency, and read the provision as limited to a grid-reliability risk requiring an immediate response by DOE in particular. It warned that DOE's broad reading of "emergency" would invite federal interventions the statute does not support, and it applied post-*Loper Bright* review, independently determining the best reading of the statute rather than deferring to the agency. An agency seeking to repurpose 202(c) for AI incidents would be arguing for exactly the kind of expansive reading the court rejected, before a court that will not defer.

Section 215A: the grid security emergency authority

A second federal authority deserves more attention than it usually receives. Section 215A of the Federal Power Act, added by the FAST Act in 2015 and codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824o-1, lets the Secretary of Energy order emergency measures once the President identifies a grid security emergency. DOE adopted procedures in 2018 to allow such orders to issue expeditiously, and commenters during that rulemaking observed that the section contains no expressly articulated limiting principles defining the kind of order the Secretary may issue. That observation has encouraged the assumption that 215A is a broad reserve power. The statutory text is narrower than the assumption.

The limiting principle is in the definitions rather than the operative provision. A "grid security emergency" under § 824o-1(a)(7) requires either a malicious act using electronic communication, an electromagnetic pulse or a geomagnetic storm event, *together with* disruption of electronic devices or networks having "significant adverse effects on the reliability of critical electric infrastructure"; or a direct physical attack on that infrastructure with the same effects. "Critical electric infrastructure" is defined at § 824o-1(a)(2) as "a system or asset of the bulk-power system." The harm that triggers the authority must therefore be harm to the grid. And what the Secretary may order under § 824o-1(b)(1) are measures "necessary in the judgment of the Secretary to protect or restore the reliability of" that infrastructure — so the purpose of the order is likewise bounded to grid reliability.

Three consequences follow. First, an AI system conducting cyber operations against electric infrastructure is a plausible fit: that is a malicious act using electronic communication with adverse effects on bulk-power reliability, and de-energizing the facility running it would serve to protect the grid. Second, an AI system that is dangerous in some other way and merely happens to run on grid power is not covered, however severe the harm, because neither the trigger nor the permitted purpose is met. The authority is about defending the grid, not about using the grid as an instrument against something else. Third, the word "malicious" carries an intent requirement that an autonomous system may not satisfy. Where no human directs the conduct and the system is misaligned rather than hostile, it is

unclear whether the predicate act is malicious at all — an interpretive gap with no case law behind it.

Two procedural features further limit the authority's usefulness in the first hours of an incident. It requires a written Presidential directive or determination identifying the emergency, not merely a decision by the Secretary. And orders expire no later than fifteen days after issuance; they may be reissued for successive fifteen-day periods, but each reissuance requires a fresh Presidential determination that the emergency continues. The Secretary must also consult, so far as practicable, with FERC and with Canadian and Mexican authorities before issuing an order.

The net assessment: 215A is a real authority that has been largely overlooked in the AI policy discussion, and in the specific case of an AI system attacking the grid it may well suffice. For the general loss-of-control case this report describes, it does not reach.

Section 606 of the Communications Act

A third emergency authority sits outside the energy statutes altogether, and is worth recording because it is the one an informed reader will raise. Section 606 of the Communications Act of 1934, codified at 47 U.S.C. § 606 and often described as the “internet kill switch,” gives the President wartime and emergency powers over communications. It bears on the network route rather than the electrical one, and on its text it does not fit a loss-of-control incident.

The provision divides along a line that matters here. Subsection (c) may be invoked on a proclamation that there exists war or a threat of war, or “a state of public peril or disaster or other national emergency” — a broad trigger. What it reaches, however, are radio communication stations and devices emitting electromagnetic radiation. Subsection (d) is the provision that reaches wire communication facilities, permitting the President to suspend or amend the Commission’s rules, to order a facility closed and its apparatus removed, or to authorize government use or control of it, in each case with just compensation to the owner. But subsection (d) may be invoked only on a proclamation that there exists “a state or threat of war involving the United States,” and an order under it expires no later than six months after that state or threat ends, or earlier if Congress so provides by concurrent resolution.

Three observations follow. The broad trigger reaches the wrong facilities and the right facilities require a war proclamation, so an AI incident that is severe but short of an act of war falls between them. Whether “wire communication” as defined in 1934 extends to internet transit over fiber has not been settled, and the question has drawn commentary without resolution. And the Act’s war powers have reportedly never been invoked by any President since 1934, so there is no practice against which to read the text.

The significance here is structural rather than practical. Section 606 is the third instance of one pattern: Section 202(c) was built for shortages of electricity, Section 215A for attacks on the grid, and Section 606 for war. Each is a genuine emergency power, each was drafted against a specific emergency, and none was drafted against this one. The gap is therefore not an oversight in a single statute but a consequence of how emergency authorities get written.

State level authorities

State	Governor	Utility commission: statutes	Commission disconnection rules	Other state actors
Alabama	Civil-defense clause: rules for practice blackouts and for “shutting off water mains, gas mains, electric power connections, and the suspension of all other public utilities” during, before and after drills or attacks (Ala. Code § 31-9-6(4)). In a declared emergency, may procure materials	Public Service Commission enforces the utility’s duty to serve (§ 37-1-49). No provision found authorizing an order to disconnect a named customer.	No order ground. Without notice only for hazard, equipment that harms service, tampering or unauthorized use (Ala. Admin. Code r. 770-X-1-.13).	—

State	Governor	Utility commission: statutes	Commission disconnection rules	Other state actors
	and facilities “by purchase, condemnation, seizure, or other means” (§ 31-9-8(a)(3)).			
Alaska	In a disaster emergency, may “commandeer or utilize any private property” (AS 26.23.020(g)(4)), allocate fuel ((g)(10)) and limit sale of combustibles ((g)(8)). No utility-specific power.	Regulatory Commission enforces the duty to furnish adequate, efficient and safe service (AS 42.05.291). No named-customer power found.	Order ground, with notice: to comply with “an order or regulation of any governmental agency with proper jurisdiction,” after 15 days’ written notice (3 AAC 52.450(b)–(c)). All customers.	—
Arizona	May commandeer property only in a “state of war emergency” (A.R.S. § 26-303(A)(2)). In an ordinary state of emergency, has all police power within the designated area and authority over state agencies (§ 26-303(B), (E)). No utility-specific power.	Corporation Commission makes orders for the “convenience, comfort, and safety” of patrons (Ariz. Const. art. 15, § 3) and, where service is “unsafe, improper, inadequate,” fixes the required practice by order (A.R.S. § 40-321(A)). The Salt River Project, a major public power provider, is outside its rate jurisdiction.	Order ground, with notice: “to comply with an order of any governmental agency having jurisdiction”; the notice must describe or attach the order (A.A.C. R14-2-211(C)(1)(f), (D)). Utilities file curtailment plans (R14-2-208(E)).	—
Arkansas	May “commandeer or utilize any private property” (Ark. Code § 12-75-114(e)(4)) and limit sale of combustibles ((e)(8)). Utility services appear only as something to be restored (§ 12-75-103). No shutoff power.	Public Service Commission enforces the duty to serve (§ 23-3-113). No named-customer power found.	No order ground. Closest: customer “violating federal, state, or local laws or regulations through use of the service,” with notice (APSC General Service Rules 6.01.L, 6.04).	—
California	A state of emergency includes “a sudden and severe energy shortage” requiring measures “beyond the authority vested in the California Public Utilities Commission” (Gov. Code § 8558(b)). May commandeer or utilize private	CPUC may require utilities to operate so as to “promote and safeguard the health and safety of its employees, ... customers, and the public” (Pub. Util. Code § 768); duty to serve (§ 451). No named-customer power	No CPUC regulation on point; grounds are set in each utility’s tariff Rule 11.	Energy Commission: utilities file emergency load-curtailment and priority-user plans; the Commission recommends curtailment plans to the Governor and Legislature that “differentiate curtailment of energy

State	Governor	Utility commission: statutes	Commission disconnection rules	Other state actors
	property (§ 8572), and holds all police power within the designated area and complete authority over state agencies (§ 8627).	found.		consumption by users” (Pub. Res. Code §§ 25701–25702). State fire code lets the fire code official authorize disconnection of utility service to a building “to safely execute emergency operations or to eliminate an immediate hazard” (Cal. Fire Code § 111.1, 2025).
Colorado	May “commandeer or utilize any private property” (C.R.S. § 24-33.5-704(7)(d)). No utility-specific power; no energy-emergency statute found.	PUC “shall” fix safe and adequate practices by order on finding service unsafe or inadequate (§ 40-4-101(1)); duty to serve (§ 40-3-101(2)); municipal utilities (§ 40-3.5-101).	Order ground (“ordered by any appropriate governmental authority”), no notice, but only for residential, small commercial and agricultural customers (4 CCR 723-3, Rules 3400, 3407(a)(VII), 3408(h)). Large customers fall to tariffs.	—
Connecticut	In a civil preparedness emergency, “shall order and enforce such blackouts” (C.G.S. § 28-9(b)(3)) and may take possession of property in a shortage or disaster (§ 28-11). Energy emergency: may proclaim one and order implementation of all or part of the state energy emergency plan (§§ 16a-9, 16a-11); violations penalized (§ 16a-13c).	PURA safety powers (§ 16-11) and power to stop work (§ 16-7a); duty to serve (§ 16-20(b)); emergency plans, including municipal utilities (§ 16-32e). No named-customer power found.	Order ground, with notice: service that would be “in contravention of any orders, ordinances or laws” of federal, state or local government (Regs. Conn. State Agencies § 16-3-100(b)(2)(A)). Reaches commercial and industrial customers.	Commissioner of Energy and Environmental Protection carries out energy-emergency activities (§ 16a-13b).
Delaware	May utilize “any private, public or quasi-public property” (20 Del. C. § 3116(b)(1)) and “take appropriate measures as described in the Energy Emergency Contingency Plan” in an energy crisis (§	PSC may order every utility to “furnish safe and adequate and proper service” (26 Del. C. § 209(a)(2)). No named-customer power found.	No general rule. The only rule limits residential nonpayment terminations in extreme weather (26 Del. Admin. Code 3002).	—

State	Governor	Utility commission: statutes	Commission disconnection rules	Other state actors
	3116(b)(9)).			
Florida	May “take effective measures for limiting or suspending ... gas and water mains, electric power distribution, and all other utility services in the general public interest” (Fla. Stat. § 252.36(6)(j)); may commandeer or utilize private property (§ 252.36(6)(d)).	PSC has jurisdiction over the statewide grid “for operational and emergency purposes” (§ 366.04(5)) and exclusive safety jurisdiction over the T&D facilities of investor-owned, cooperative and municipal utilities (§ 366.04(6)); duty to serve (§ 366.03). No named-customer power found.	No order ground. Customer’s violation of “any state or municipal law or regulation governing electric service,” with notice (Fla. Admin. Code R. 25-6.105(5)(a)).	—
Georgia	May “commandeer or utilize any private property” (O.C.G.A. § 38-3-51(d)(4)); in an emergency declared solely for energy, seizure and commandeering are limited to “energy resources” (§ 38-3-51(h)).	PSC may “allocate any utility service in such manner as it deems proper in order to protect the public health, safety, or welfare,” including suspending or terminating rates, contracts and rules, on a finding of shortage after hearing or, temporarily, of emergency without prior hearing (§ 46-2-71).	Order ground (“by order of the Georgia Public Service Commission, any Court, or any other authorized public agency”), residential only (Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. 515-3-2-.01(c)). Commission may allocate service in a shortage, or by temporary order in an emergency (515-3-1-.08).	—
Hawaii	May “shut off water mains, gas mains, electric power connections, or suspend other services” (HRS § 127A-13(a)(6)) and assure continuity of critical infrastructure ((a)(11)). Petroleum-shortage powers (ch. 125C) do not reach electricity.	PUC general powers (HRS § 269-6); service standards in General Order No. 7. No named-customer power found.	No order ground. Without notice for hazard, equipment misuse, tampering or unauthorized use (PUC General Order No. 7, Rule 4.6; HAR § 6-60-8).	County mayors hold the same shutoff power in a local emergency (HRS § 127A-13(b)(3)).
Idaho	May “commandeer or utilize any private property, real or personal” (Idaho Code § 46-1008(5)(d)). No utility-specific power.	PUC enforces the duty to serve (§ 61-302). No named-customer power found.	Order ground for large customers, no notice: termination “upon order by any court, the Commission, or any other duly authorized public authority” (IDAPA 31.21.01.604.02;	—

State	Governor	Utility commission: statutes	Commission disconnection rules	Other state actors
			residential parallel, 303.02). The utility must notify the Commission 7 days before terminating an industrial or large commercial customer, and the Commission may stay it (Rule 605).	
Illinois	May take possession of personal property, including “coal, oils, gasoline, and other fuels” (20 ILCS 3305/7(4)), and “control, restrict, and regulate by rationing, freezing, use of quotas, prohibitions on shipments, price fixing, allocation or other means” the use and distribution of commodities and services (§ 7(12)).	ICC may require each utility to operate “as to promote and safeguard the health and safety of its employees, customers, and the public” (220 ILCS 5/8-505); duty to serve (5/8-101). No named-customer power found.	“Cooperation with civil authorities” is a ground for disconnection, exempt from notice and from time-of-day limits; reaches non-residential customers (83 Ill. Adm. Code 280.130(b)(11), (h)(4), (l)). “Civil authorities” is undefined.	—
Indiana	May commandeer or use private property (IC 10-14-3-12(g)(4)) and allocate essential materials and services ((g)(11)). Energy emergency: controls, quotas and “plans ... for the curtailment of energy,” by end use, “consistent with existing transmission and distribution systems,” applied uniformly within each class and involuntary only after voluntary measures fail (§ 10-14-3-13(f)–(g)).	IURC may in an emergency temporarily alter, amend or, with the utility’s consent, suspend rates, service and practices (IC 8-1-2-113). HEA 1002 (signed 26 Feb. 2026) limits this to depression, war or disaster of unprecedented size, with the IURC recommending a governor’s declaration.†	Order ground (“upon order by any court, the commission, or other duly authorized public authority”), no notice, residential only (170 IAC 4-1-16(b)(2); 4-1-1(c)).	State agencies, including the IURC, must carry out the governor’s energy-supply emergency measures (IC 10-14-3-14).
Iowa	May “commandeer or utilize any private property” (Iowa Code § 29C.6(12)) and control occupancy of premises (§ 29C.6(15)). Energy emergency: may regulate operating hours of energy-consuming facilities	Utilities Commission enforces the duty to serve (§ 476.8). No named-customer power found.	No order ground. Without notice for hazard, equipment misuse, tampering or unauthorized use (199 IAC 20.4(14); co-ops and municipals, 199 IAC 27.4).	Electrical inspector may by written order condemn an installation or “order service to such installation disconnected,” immediately where there is a serious and proximate threat to health or property (§

State	Governor	Utility commission: statutes	Commission disconnection rules	Other state actors
	and set up a distribution system, but has “no authority to suspend, amend, or nullify any service being provided by a public utility” under a federal agency’s order (§ 473.8(2)(a)).			103.26).
Kansas	May “commandeer or utilize any private property” (K.S.A. 48-925(c)(4)) and limit sale of combustibles ((c)(8)). No utility-specific power.	KCC supervises service and may order changes (K.S.A. 66-101b). No named-customer power found.	No order ground (KCC Electric, Natural Gas and Water Billing Standards § IV, 2012, adopted by Commission order).	—
Kentucky	May “seize, take, or condemn” for the duration of the emergency “all stocks of fuel” and “facilities, including buildings and plants” (KRS 39A.100(1)(c)), and limit sale or consumption of goods in a shortage ((1)(h)).	In a transmission emergency a utility may not curtail retail service in its territory until it has interrupted every other customer whose interruption may relieve the emergency, interruptible customers excepted (KRS 278.214); duty to serve (278.030(2)).	For code violations, ten days’ notice “unless ordered to terminate immediately by a governmental official” (807 KAR 5:006 § 15(1)(e)). Disconnection required on written notice from law enforcement that service powers illegal gambling devices (807 KAR 5:041 § 20).	—
Louisiana	May “commandeer or utilize any private property” (La. R.S. 29:724(D)(4)) and limit sale of combustibles ((D)(6)). No utility-specific power.	Public Service Commission (La. Const. art. IV, § 21); service obligations (La. R.S. 45:122). No named-customer power found.	No comprehensive rule; LPSC orders limit residential disconnection in extreme weather (General Order R-29706). Grounds are set in tariffs.	—
Maine	After proclaiming an energy emergency and consulting the Department of Energy Resources, may “regulate the generation, distribution and consumption of electricity,” acting on PUC recommendations (37-B M.R.S. § 742(2)(B)(4)), and procure capacity including interruptible and demand-response	PUC makes recommendations under § 742; duty to serve (35-A M.R.S. § 301(1)). No named-customer power found.	Official-directive ground, no prior notice: “a directive from the State Electric Inspector, State Pipeline Safety Inspector, or local code enforcement officer to disconnect service for safety reasons” (65-407 C.M.R. ch. 815, § 10(A)(9), (D)(1)). All customers.	Department of Energy Resources is consulted before energy-emergency orders (§ 742(2)(B)).

State	Governor	Utility commission: statutes	Commission disconnection rules	Other state actors
	resources ((2)(B)(9)). Eminent domain is unavailable in an energy emergency ((2)(C)(1)).			
Maryland	Energy emergency: programs, controls, standards, priorities and quotas for the allocation of energy, and hours of public and commercial buildings (Pub. Safety § 14-304).† State-of-emergency powers (§ 14-107) contain no utility language found.	PSC enforces the duty to serve (Pub. Util. § 5-303). No named-customer power found.	No order ground; termination rules cover service to dwelling units only (COMAR 20.31.01.01, 20.31.02.03).	Executive Order 01.01.2026.16 (23 Sept. 2026) directs the Maryland Energy Administration to press the PSC, PJM and FERC for curtailment of data-center load before other customers in emergencies; it does not direct the PSC.
Massachusetts	Civil Defense Act: authority over “maintenance, extension or interconnection of services of public utility or public service companies,” including municipal systems (St. 1950, c. 639, § 7(b)); may take land, buildings, machinery and fuel (§ 5(b)); orders displace conflicting law (§ 8A). Energy-emergency regulations under G.L. c. 25A, § 8.†	DPU enforces the duty to serve (G.L. c. 164, § 92). No named-customer power found.	Residential only: termination on any ground other than nonpayment needs DPU approval after hearing, with a saving for “cooperation with civil authorities” (220 CMR 25.01, 25.02(3)).	—
Michigan	May “commandeer or utilize private property” (MCL 30.405(1)(d)). Energy emergency (90 days; Legislature may end or extend): “specific restrictions on the use and sale of energy resources,” conditions of sale to consumers, directions to suppliers to serve priority users, suspension of statutes and rules (MCL 10.83–10.84).	MPSC general jurisdiction (MCL 460.6). No named-customer power found.	No order ground. A utility may shut off service temporarily “in a state or national emergency” without advance notice; all customers (Mich. Admin. Code R 460.136).	—
Minnesota	In cooperation with federal authorities, may direct “shutting	PUC enforces the duty to serve (§ 216B.04). No named-customer	Order ground, with notice: “to comply with any order or request of	The Executive Council or the Legislature, not the governor, declares

State	Governor	Utility commission: statutes	Commission disconnection rules	Other state actors
	off water mains, gas mains, electric power connections” and suspension of other utility services (Minn. Stat. § 12.21, subd. 3(7)). Once an energy supply emergency is declared, governor and the Division of Emergency Management implement the conservation and allocation plan, 30 days unless renewed by the Legislature (§ 216C.15).	power found.	any governmental authority having jurisdiction,” at least 5 days’ notice (Minn. R. 7820.1000(1), 7820.2400). All customers.	an energy supply emergency (§ 216C.15, subd. 3).
Mississippi	In cooperation with federal authorities, may direct “shutting off water mains, gas mains, electric power connections and the suspension of all other utility services” (Miss. Code § 33-15-11(b)); may commandeer private property in a disaster beyond local control (§ 33-15-11(c)(3)) and control use and distribution of fuel.	PSC enforces service obligations and may order changes (§ 77-3-33). No named-customer power found.	No order ground. Without notice for fraudulent or unlawful use or a dangerous condition (39 Miss. Admin. Code Pt. 3, R. 3-1-8, § 100).	—
Missouri	In a state of emergency, may “seize, take or requisition” fuel stocks and facilities, including buildings and plants (RSMo § 44.100.1(3)(c)), ration and allocate commodities ((3)(d)), and direct activities “including production, transportation, power and communication facilities” ((3)(e)).	PSC enforces the duty to provide safe and adequate service (§ 393.130). No named-customer power found.	No order ground; rules are residential only, with a catch-all “As provided by state or federal law,” with notice (20 CSR 4240-13.050(1)(I)).	—
Montana	Emergency-management powers (MCA § 10-3-104) contain no property or utility language. Energy emergency (90	PSC enforces the duty to serve (§ 69-3-201). No named-customer power found.	Order ground (“upon order by any court, the Commission or any other duly authorized public authority”), no notice, residential only	—

State	Governor	Utility commission: statutes	Commission disconnection rules	Other state actors
	days unless extended): “programs, controls, standards, priorities, and quotas for the production, allocation, and conservation, and consumption of energy, including plans for the curtailment of energy,” by end use and consistent with T&D systems (§ 90-4-310).†		(ARM 38.5.1401, 38.5.1407(1)(b)).	
Nebraska	May “commandeer or utilize any private property” (Neb. Rev. Stat. § 81-829.40(6)(d)) and limit sale of combustibles ((6)(h)). No utility-specific power.	None. Nebraska is served entirely by public power (§ 70-1101); the Public Service Commission does not regulate electric service.	None; no commission regulates electric service.	Public power district boards act for their own systems; no state official holds service authority.
Nevada	May procure materials and facilities by “purchase, condemnation, seizure” (NRS 414.070(3)). Energy emergency: orders for “the regulation as necessary of the allocation, conservation or use of water or energy,” with force of law, energy including electricity; civil penalty up to \$1,000 a day (NRS 416.020, 416.060, 416.100).	PUCN enforces the duty to serve (NRS 704.040). No named-customer power found.	Order ground (“upon the order of any court or the Commission”), no notice, residential only (NAC 704.303, 704.350(3)).	—
New Hampshire	May make, amend, suspend and rescind orders, rules and regulations in a state of emergency (RSA 4:45, 4:47); § 4:47 contains no property or utility language.	PUC enforces the duty to serve (RSA 374:1). No named-customer power found.	Disconnection “at the request of state or municipal officials such as fire, police, or other emergency response officials” is recognized and exempt from reporting; all customers (N.H. Admin. Code En 1203.11(f), which replaced Puc 1203.11).	—
New Jersey	May “commandeer and	BPU enforces the duty	Order ground, all	—

State	Governor	Utility commission: statutes	Commission disconnection rules	Other state actors
	utilize ... any privately owned property” (N.J.S.A. App. A:9-34), issue orders “modifying and controlling illumination” in blackouts (App. A:9-45) and take property in extraordinary emergencies (App. A:9-51). Energy emergency under N.J.S.A. 52:27F-17, reported to allow orders that users reduce or cease use and distributors reduce, increase or stop distribution.†	to serve (N.J.S.A. 48:3-3(a)); energy-emergency rules let it require users to implement reduction measures (N.J.A.C. 14:29-2.3).† P.L. 2026, c. 32 (approved 7 July 2026) puts large data centers ahead of residential customers for curtailment in system emergencies, counted as firm load shed; BPU standards due within 12 months.	customers: may “suspend or curtail or discontinue service ... for compliance in good faith with any governmental order or directive,” with notice only “to the extent reasonably possible” (N.J.A.C. 14:3-3A.1(a)2, (d)).	
New Mexico	Emergency-management powers (NMSA § 12-10-4) contain no property or utility language. Energy emergency: executive orders for “allocation of available supplies of energy resources among areas, users, persons or categories of persons or users” and restrictions on nonessential use (§ 12-12-3).†	PRC enforces the duty to serve (§ 62-8-2). No named-customer power found.	No order ground (17.9.560.12(F) NMAC). Utilities file curtailment plans (17.9.560.15(F)); residential service may be cut temporarily in “a state of emergency” (17.5.410.34).	—
New York	May suspend laws and issue directives in a disaster emergency (Exec. Law § 29-a). On the governor’s finding of an energy or fuel supply emergency, the commissioner may “allocate available supplies of energy or energy resources among areas, users, persons or categories of persons or users” and restrict nonessential use; six-month limit without legislative consent (Energy Law § 5-117).	PSC may order improvements and prescribe “safe, efficient and adequate property, equipment and appliances” (PSL § 66(2), (5)); duty to serve (§ 65(1)). No named-customer power found.	Order ground, nonresidential: may “suspend, curtail or disconnect service to a building, unit or piece of equipment” where “there is a governmental order or directive requiring the utility to do so,” advance notice only where reasonably feasible (16 NYCRR § 13.13(a)(3), (b)).	The commissioner under Energy Law § 5-117 exercises the allocation power and may supersede other agencies’ emergency powers.

State	Governor	Utility commission: statutes	Commission disconnection rules	Other state actors
North Carolina	With Council of State concurrence, may regulate “the maintenance, extension, and operation of public utility and transportation services and facilities” (G.S. § 166A-19.30(b)(3)). Energy crisis: orders setting “controls, standards, priorities, and quotas for the allocation, conservation and consumption of energy resources,” subject to Council of State approval (§ 113B-22).	Utilities Commission must implement the governor’s energy-crisis orders (§ 113B-23); utilities file emergency curtailment plans identifying priority loads (§ 113B-20.1); duty to serve (§ 62-131(b)).	No order ground (NCUC Rules R8-20, R12-8). Utilities file emergency load-reduction plans (R8-41).	Attorney General and law enforcement enforce energy-crisis orders; violation is a Class 1 misdemeanor and may be enjoined (§ 113B-24).
North Dakota	May “commandeer or utilize any private property” (N.D.C.C. § 37-17.1-05(6)(d)) and control and allocate fuel in critical shortages ((6)(j)). No utility-specific power.	PSC enforces the duty to serve (§ 49-04-01). No named-customer power found.	No order ground (N.D. Admin. Code § 69-09-02-05.1).	—
Ohio	Energy emergency: may order “any electric light, natural gas or gas, or pipeline company” to sell electricity or fuel, order other conservation or emergency distribution measures, and restrict consumption by government offices and industrial and commercial establishments (R.C. § 4935.03). By rule, “the governor may order mandatory curtailment of the use of electricity after consultation with the commission” (Ohio Adm. Code 4901:5-19-05(B)).	PUCO may order repairs and improvements (R.C. § 4905.38) and in an emergency temporarily alter rates and schedules (§ 4909.16); duty to serve (§ 4905.22). No named-customer power found.	Order ground for residential customers only (Ohio Adm. Code 4901:1-18-03(B)). Nonresidential: service that would violate law (4901:1-10-15).	—
Oklahoma	In a proclaimed	Corporation	Customer-violation	—

State	Governor	Utility commission: statutes	Commission disconnection rules	Other state actors
	emergency, may “assume regulatory control over all essential resources,” set priorities and allocate them; resources expressly include “electric power” (63 O.S. § 683.9).	Commission (Okla. Const. art. IX, § 18); duty to serve rests on case law. No named-customer power found.	ground only: failure to comply with a Commission order, with notice (OAC 165:35-21-2(a)).	
Oregon	Holds all police power within the designated area (ORS 401.168(1)). Energy emergency: “involuntary curtailments, adjustments or allocations in the supply and consumption of energy resources applicable to all suppliers and consumers,” uniform within each class; electric load curtailment must be ordered by executive order directed to the PUC (ORS 176.795).	PUC implements curtailment plans (ORS 757.710–757.730); a utility is not liable for curtailment under an approved plan (§ 757.730); duty to serve (§ 757.020).	Commission ground, with notice: “When the Commission approves the disconnection of service” (OAR 860-021-0305(1)(k)); commercial customers get 5 business days’ notice (860-021-0505).	—
Pennsylvania	May “commandeer or utilize any private, public or quasi-public property” (35 Pa.C.S. § 7301(f)(4)). Executive Order 2026-05 (18 Aug. 2026) directs a petition to the PUC so that data centers are curtailed before any other class unless they have procured new capacity covering all of their demand.	Duty to serve and orders (66 Pa.C.S. § 1501). In a load emergency utilities take steps including “reduction or interruption of service to one or more customers” (52 Pa. Code § 57.52(a)(1)). Rewrite to set a curtailment order under way (Docket M-2026-3064961; tentative order scheduled 1 Oct. 2026, final targeted Jan. 2027).	No order ground; termination rules are residential only (52 Pa. Code ch. 56). Load-emergency shedding under § 57.52.	—
Rhode Island	May “commandeer or utilize any private property” (R.I.G.L. § 30-15-9(e)(4)) and regulate the sale and distribution of fuel and other necessities in a	PUC must order repairs or changes to inadequate plant (§ 39-4-2); duty to serve (§ 39-2-1(a)). No named-customer	Order ground, no notice: service “may be discontinued immediately ... when ordered to do so by any governmental agency or official	—

State	Governor	Utility commission: statutes	Commission disconnection rules	Other state actors
	shortage ((e)(12)).	power found.	having jurisdiction” (815-RICR-30-00-1.3(H)(2)(b)). All customers.	
South Carolina	May use all state resources, transfer agency functions, order evacuation and control occupancy of premises (S.C. Code § 25-1-440(a)). No property or utility language found.	PSC enforces the duty to serve (§ 58-27-1510). No named-customer power found.	Customer-violation ground: use that “conflicts with, or violates orders, ordinances or laws of the State ... or of the commission,” with notice (S.C. Code Regs. 103-342(m), 103-352).	—
South Dakota	May “call upon and use any facilities, equipment, other nonmedical supplies, and resources available from any source” (SDCL § 34-48A-5(3)). No utility-specific power.	PUC enforces the duty to serve (§ 49-34A-2). No named-customer power found.	No order ground, and no ground for disconnection without notice (ARSD 20:10:20:04).	—
Tennessee	May “take effective measures for limiting or suspending ... gas and water mains, electric power distribution, and all other utility services in the general public interest” (T.C.A. § 58-2-107(e)(10)); may commandeer or utilize private property ((e)(4)).	TPUC general jurisdiction (§ 65-4-114). Nearly all Tennessee electricity comes through TVA and its distributors, which TPUC does not regulate.	No order ground (Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1220-04-04-.19); reaches only TPUC-regulated utilities.	—
Texas	May “commandeer or use any private property” (Gov’t Code § 418.017(c)), suspend laws (§ 418.016) and control occupancy of premises (§ 418.018(c)).	PUCT allocates load shedding, including among cooperatives and municipal utilities, with critical-load priority (Util. Code § 38.076). Transmission-voltage customers interconnected after 2025, other than critical industrial and gas loads, must have a protocol and any necessary equipment “to allow the load to be curtailed during firm load shed” (§	No order ground (16 TAC §§ 25.29, 25.483). In competitive areas, retail providers may authorize disconnection of medium and large non-residential customers (§ 25.483(b)(1)).	ERCOT, after deploying available market services in an energy emergency, may direct a utility to require a large load (75 MW threshold) with on-site backup generation to run it or curtail (Util. Code § 37.0561(c), (e)).

State	Governor	Utility commission: statutes	Commission disconnection rules	Other state actors
		39.170(a)). Docket 59220 (24 July 2026) requires a co-located 260 MW data center to disconnect fully within 30 minutes of an ERCOT instruction in a transmission emergency (§ 39.169).		
Utah	Energy emergency (60 days; renewal by the Legislature): may “require involuntary curtailments, adjustments, or allocations in the supply and consumption of energy resources applicable to all suppliers and consumers,” applied uniformly and “without discrimination within a class” (Utah Code §§ 53-2a-1007, -1008); standby curtailment priorities (§ 53-2a-1006).	PSC fixes safe and adequate rules after hearing (§ 54-4-7); duty to serve (§ 54-3-1). No named-customer power found.	Unclear: utility may cease service where use is “prohibited or forbidden under the authority of a law or municipal ordinance or regulation,” no notice stated (Utah Admin. Code R746-310-2(D)).	—
Vermont	May seize means of transportation, “all stocks of fuel” and “facilities, including buildings and plants” (20 V.S.A. § 11(3)). No utility-specific power.	PUC enforces the duty to serve (30 V.S.A. § 219). No named-customer power found.	Commission ground: “Except at the request of the customer or upon order of the Commission, no utility may disconnect” non-residential service without delinquency and notice (PUC Rule 3.402; residential, Rule 3.302).	—
Virginia	May “control, restrict, allocate or regulate the use, sale, production and distribution of food, fuel, clothing and other commodities, materials, goods, services and resources” (Va. Code § 44-146.17(1)). On an imminent threat of substantial curtailment of a utility’s operation, may “take immediate	SCC may authorize utility action when demand cannot be met and require curtailment plans (§ 56-250), order emergency transfers (§ 56-249.1); electric energy emergency conservation plan (20 VAC 5-300-20).	No general rule; 20VAC5-330 limits residential disconnection on medical grounds only.	—

State	Governor	Utility commission: statutes	Commission disconnection rules	Other state actors
	possession of the utility, its plant and equipment” (§ 56-510).			
Washington	May waive “regulations, tariffs, and notice requirements under the jurisdiction of the utilities and transportation commission” (RCW 43.06.220(2)(d)). Energy emergency: “programs, controls, standards, and priorities for the production, allocation, and consumption of energy” (RCW 43.21G.040).†	UTC enforces the duty to serve (RCW 80.28.010). No named-customer power found.	No order ground (WAC 480-100-128). Utilities must disable remote disconnection for designated critical infrastructure ((6)(a)).	—
West Virginia	May procure materials and facilities by “condemnation, or seizure pending institution of condemnation proceedings” (W. Va. Code § 15-5-6(g)(3)). No utility-specific power.	PSC enforces the duty to serve (§ 24-3-1). No named-customer power found.	No order ground (W. Va. Code R. § 150-3-4.8.2).	—
Wisconsin	May “take, use, and destroy, in the name of the state, private property for emergency management purposes” and allocate materials and facilities (Wis. Stat. § 323.12(4)). No utility-specific power.	PSC enforces the duty to provide adequate service (§ 196.03). No named-customer power found.	Customer-violation ground: failure to comply with a statute, rule or “commission order pertaining to conservation or availability of service,” 10 days’ notice (Wis. Admin. Code § PSC 113.0302(2)(e)).	—
Wyoming	May assume operational control and procure supplies (Wyo. Stat. § 19-13-104). No property or utility language found.	PSC enforces service obligations and may order changes (§ 37-3-112). No named-customer power found.	“Cooperation with civil authorities” permits disconnection “without advance notice”; all customers (Wyo. PSC Rules ch. 3, § 3-9(l)).	—

Notes. † Described from a secondary source or an older code edition. “—” means no additional state actor was identified. Also note that seven states have seen public safety power shutoff events: California, Oregon, Nevada, Washington, Utah, Colorado and Idaho. Authority rests with the *utility*, however, and the public commission supervises and requires reporting afterward. In each event,

the trigger was a wildfire or natural disaster.

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Statute text for the remaining rows was read on the official legislature sites and on Justia, FindLaw and Public.Law mirrors of the current codes.

Appendix C. Research agenda

Note: This appendix was drafted by Claude (Opus 5.5) under the authors’ direction and from the sources listed, then reviewed and edited by the authors, who are responsible for its content.

Some uncertainties remain in the main report. What follows is a research agenda organized as nine discrete questions, grouped by subject. Each describes where to start, what a usable answer would look like, and which part of the report it bears on.

A. The AI systems

Q1. If a rogue AI system faced imminent shutdown at its current sites, could it preserve its own operation by moving to other compute? The question is whether the system’s capacity to keep running — its weights plus the hardware serving them — survives the loss of the named facilities. If it does, grid de-energization is a delaying action rather than a stop, which determines whether the whole subject is worth pursuing. *Start with* the UK AI Security Institute’s RepliBench, which decomposes autonomous replication into obtaining resources, exfiltrating weights, replicating onto compute, and persisting there, and with Anthropic’s October 2026 work on replication across consumer devices. Two sub-questions sharpen it. Most weight-security work assumes an adversary outside the trust boundary¹, so the first is which controls bind an adversary already inside it; on present reading that is a short list, essentially the physically enforced ones such as hardware rate limits and air-gapped enclaves. The second is how the relationship between capability and portability is changing, since the argument that dangerous systems cannot move quickly holds only while the threshold at which a model becomes both dangerous and portable stays above consumer hardware. *A usable answer* is an order-of-magnitude estimate of the time to relocate serving capacity at full capability, a list of what would be observable while it happened, and an estimate of how fast that threshold is falling. *Bears on* Section 1 and the conclusion: whether a grid shutdown can be more than a delaying action.

Q2. Which physical sites serve a given frontier model, and could that mapping be known before an emergency? Failure mode 1 identifies the model-to-site mapping as the binding constraint on any targeted order. Public inventories locate the largest facilities but not which models run in them, and they miss sites below roughly 100 MW. Serving capacity

¹ Nevo et al. (2024), [Securing AI Model Weights](#) (RAND); Greenblatt et al. (2024), [AI Control: Improving Safety Despite Intentional Subversion](#).

is also often spread across cloud regions in several countries, so a US order may reach only part of it. Whether the relevant set is three sites or thirty, and how much of it lies within US jurisdiction, decides whether a targeted order is coherent or amounts to a regional blackout. *Start with* Epoch AI's data center inventory, company infrastructure disclosures and cloud region listings, job postings, data center trade press, utility interconnection queues, county permitting records and land filings, and the reporting rules once proposed under Executive Order 14110 as a template for what a registry would collect. *A usable answer* is a defensible count with a confidence range, distinguishing training from serving capacity and US from foreign sites, together with an estimate of how quickly the mapping changes. *Bears on* failure mode 1.

Q3. Would a loss-of-control event be recognized early enough for a shutdown order still to matter? Every one of the five failure modes in Section 2 assumes someone has already concluded that an event is under way. The relevant window closes when the system has distributed itself beyond the facilities a US order could reach, so detection lag has to be measured against Q1's relocation estimate. *Start with* the incident reporting obligations in California SB 53 and the EU GPAI Code of Practice, and what the major developers have actually committed to detect and report. *A usable answer* is the realistic lag between onset and official awareness, compared against the time the system would need to put itself out of reach. *Bears on* all five failure modes in Section 2, and the conclusion.

B. The computing facilities

Q4. How long can large AI data centers run without grid power? The difference between four minutes and four days changes what an order accomplishes. *Start with* state air permits for backup generators, which are public and typically specify generator capacity and permitted runtime hours, plus fuel storage filings and announced co-located generation. *A usable answer* is a distribution of backup duration across the largest sites, and the feasibility of options for humans to manually disrupt the backup power. *Bears on* failure mode 2.

Q5. What else would lose power, both on the same substations and feeders and inside the facility itself? The collateral cost of de-energizing a given facility, and therefore the proportionality of any order, varies site by site. Because electrical supply cannot be cut below the level of the building, a feeder-level cut also darkens every other tenant of a multi-tenant facility, which may include healthcare, payments, emergency services and government cloud workloads, and each of them then faces the restart problem. *Start with* utility transmission and distribution maps, FERC Form 715 filings, state interconnection dockets, and colocation providers' published customer and compliance information. *A usable answer* is a description, for three to five representative sites, of what else would lose power, on the grid and inside the fence. *Bears on* the "Targeted" criterion in Section 2, and failure mode 3.

C. Legal authority and liability

Q6. Could any existing authority be stretched to cut power to an AI facility? Failure mode 4 finds that no official clearly holds this authority, and a positive answer here would

narrow the report's central claim. Three routes deserve a closer test. The first is Section 215A of the Federal Power Act. Appendix B concludes that it reaches only harm to the grid, but two points have no case law behind them: whether an autonomous system's conduct can be "malicious," and how much of the harm from an AI system attacking other targets would have to fall on the bulk-power system before the trigger is met. The second is the power of governors in Florida, Hawaii and Tennessee to suspend electric service in a declared emergency, which has never been used against a single customer. The third is law enforcement. Police have asked utilities to cut power to a single building in hostage and barricade incidents, and several state commission rules recognize disconnection at the request of police or "civil authorities" (Appendix B). That authority is tightly scoped and usually depends on the utility's cooperation, but it is the nearest existing practice to a targeted, security-driven shutdown. *Start with* the statutory text at 16 U.S.C. 824o-1, DOE's 2018 procedural rule and the comment record behind it, and the definition of "grid security emergency"; the Florida, Hawaii and Tennessee emergency statutes; and the case law and utility protocols governing police requests to disconnect service. *A usable answer* is a short legal memo on each route: whether it could be invoked for an AI incident, what would have to be true for it to apply, how quickly it could move, and what limits it carries, such as the 15-day term on orders under Section 215A. *Bears on* failure mode 4.

Q7. Would a utility comply with a shutdown order, and who would bear the liability?

Compliance is assumed in nearly every discussion of a kill switch and should not be. Section 2 finds that utility rules in about ten states would let a utility comply immediately with a governor's order, but permission is not obligation, and those rules say nothing about who pays if the order proves mistaken. A utility that cuts off a paying customer, and with it every other tenant in the facility, without clear statutory cover is exposed to damages claims. In California, *Gantner v. PG&E* shows that an approved regulatory program can bar such claims, but no equivalent program exists for a security-driven shutdown. *Start with* tariff provisions on curtailment and force majeure, the commission disconnection rules in Appendix B, state obligation-to-serve law, and California's public safety power shutoff program as the one working model of a deliberate shutdown with bounded liability. *A usable answer* is an assessment of whether a utility would act immediately, seek an order in writing, or litigate, and of what liability and compensation regime would make an order executable and a restart possible. *Bears on* failure modes 3 and 4.

D. Grid institutions

Q8. Could FERC's large-load interconnection procedures carry a shutdown condition?

Appendix A treats Docket RM26-4-000 as the live vehicle and should be checked against where it actually landed. *Start with* the October 2025 ANOPR, the April 2026 intent-to-act order, the June 2026 show cause orders to the RTOs, the subsequent compliance filings, and SPP's High Impact Large Load tariff. *A usable answer* is the docket's current status and whether its provisions are drafted broadly enough to extend to AI emergency needs. *Bears on* failure modes 2 and 5.

Q9. Do grid standards and operating procedures contemplate deliberately dropping a large load, or restoring it afterwards? Section 2 asserts that they do not: NERC's standards address losing a large load unexpectedly rather than dropping one deliberately,

and the regional operators' procedures are written for reliability rather than security. Because that is an assessment of absence, it should be checked directly. Whether the grid can physically absorb such a drop is a separate question, and the two PJM load-transfer events described under failure mode 2 largely answer it for loads at the scale observed. *Start with* NERC's EOP family on emergency operations, including manual load shed provisions, along with the TPL and CIP families and the NERC glossary; the computational-load standards NERC must file by 31 December 2026; the public emergency operations manuals of PJM, MISO, SPP, ERCOT and CAISO; and the GridEx exercise series, which may already have rehearsed something adjacent. *A usable answer* is a yes or no with citations, for the standards and for each operator's procedures, and if no, the nearest existing analogue and how far it falls short. *Bears on* failure modes 3 and 5.

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